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I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held in Stanberry v. 
State, 343 Md. 720,684 A.2d 823 
(1996), that a warrantless search of 
a bus passenger's luggage during a 
drug interdiction violated the 
Fourth Amendment insofar as the 
police unreasonably concluded the 
luggage had been abandoned. 
On August 16, 1993, 
plainclothes Maryland State 
Troopers were monitoring buses at 
the Maryland House rest stop on 
Interstate 95 in connection with 
drug interdiction activities. A 
Greyhound passenger bus carrying 
defendant Labaron Stanberry 
("Stanberry") arrived from 
Newark, New Jersey. The passen-
gers disembarked to use the rest 
stop's facilities, after which time 
the troopers advised the bus driver 
of the pending interdiction. When 
the troopers believed that all the 
passengers had returned to the bus, 
they went aboard and asked the 
passengers to identify their bag-
gage. A suit bag in the overhead 
luggage rack was unclaimed by 
any of the passengers following 
the troopers' inquiry. The troopers 
opened it and found a bag of 
cocaine and three smaller bags 
each containing approximately 100 
baggies of heroin. Stanberry, who 
was the last of the passengers to 
return to the bus from the rest stop, 
was asked by the troopers if the 
suit bag belonged to him. He 
acknowledged, then denied its 
ownership before finally admitting 
that he was transporting the drugs 
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to Virginia in exchange for $300. 
He was arrested and charged with 
possession with intent to distribute 
and transporting a controlled dan-
gerous substance into the state. 
At his suppression hearing in 
the Circuit Court of Maryland for 
Harford County, Stanberry moved 
to exclude the drugs on the basis 
that the troopers' warrantless 
search violated the Fourth Amend-
ment and that his statement was 
suppressible as fruit of that illegal 
search. The State maintained that 
the search was permissible under 
the Fourth Amendment because 
the troopers reasonably believed 
that the bag was abandoned since 
none of the passengers claimed it. 
Stanberry testified that he had not 
abandoned the bag, but that he 
merely left it on the bus while he 
went to use the facilities at the rest 
stop. The suppression court, how-
ever, found that the police could 
reasonably conclude that Stanberry 
did abandon the bag and denied 
the motion. As a result, Stanberry 
was convicted and sentenced to 
fifteen years imprisonment, with 
all but three years suspended. 
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The Court of Special Appeals 
of Maryland affirmed the con-
viction, holding that the search 
was lawful and that the troopers' 
belief that Stanberry had aban-
doned the bag was reasonable. 
Stanberry's ensuing petition for 
certiorari was granted by the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland. 
Stanberry's chief argument 
was that, although the Fourth 
Amendment's protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures 
does not apply to abandoned 
property, he had demonstrated no 
intent to abandon the bag; thus the 
search was illegal. Stanberry, 343 
Md. at 730, 684 A.2d at 828. The 
State countered that even if the bag 
was not actually abandoned, the 
search was justified because the 
troopers reasonably believed that it 
had been. ld. at 730, 684 A.2d at 
828. The State also argued that the 
warrantless search was conducted 
in good faith. ld. at 731, 684 A.2d 
at 828. 
The court first observed that 
drug interdiction activities in and 
of themselves are constitutional. 
ld. at 730, 684 A.2d at 828 (citing 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 
(1991)). The constitutionality of 
drug interdictions conducted on 
buses, however, had never before 
been addressed by the Maryland 
courts even though such operations 
have become widely used in law 
enforcement to the point where 
"basic methods" now exist. ld. at 
728, 684 A.2d at 827. The court 
appeared to accept that the inter-
diction conducted by the Maryland 
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troopers in the case at bar, which 
involved boarding the bus, asking 
passengers to identify their lug-
gage and searching "abandoned" 
luggage, was consistent with these 
basic methods. Id The court 
stressed, however, that the con-
stitution imposes certain limita-
tions as articulated in Bostick, 
where the United States Supreme 
Court rejected the view then held 
by the Florida courts that drug 
interdictions on buses were per se 
unconstitutional. Stanberry at 
729-30, 684 A.2d at 828. Under 
Bostick, police may conduct an 
interdiction in the manner under-
taken by the Maryland troopers, 
including making a request to 
search a passenger's luggage, pro-
vided the officers do not convey a 
message through force or authority 
that compliance with that request 
is required. Stanberry at 729-30, 
684 A.2d at 828. 
Having resolved the threshold 
question of whether interdiction is 
constitutional, the court turned to 
the proper inquiry required to 
assess Fourth Amendment protec-
tion with respect to searches 
arising out of interdiction. The 
court recognized that "the scope of 
protection afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment is defined in terms of 
the individual's 'legitimate expec-
tation of privacy.'" Id at 731,684 
A.2d at 828 (quoting Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 
Abandoning property, however, 
effectively defeats that ex-
pectation. Id at 731, 684 A.2d at 
829. Therefore, the issues for the 
court were whether Stanberry had 
a legitimate expectation of privacy 
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in his suit bag and whether he in 
fact abandoned the bag, thereby 
surrendering the expectation of 
privacy that would otherwise 
preclude a warrantless search. Id. 
The court of appeals concluded 
that Stanberry did retain such an 
expectation of privacy because the 
suit bag had not been abandoned. 
Id at 738-39, 684 A.2d at 832. 
Strictly speaking, the property 
abandonment-expectation of 
privacy question is, in the Fourth 
Amendment context, often a 
question of fact and is subjective 
in nature, because the inquiry first 
focuses on whether the property 
owner actually expected a measure 
of privacy. Id. at 732-33, 684 
A.2d at 829. The facts necessarily 
leading to this determination 
result, however, from an objective 
analysis to determine if the prop-
erty owner manifested an intent to 
abandon the property. Id. Here, 
the court enumerated several key 
factors: (1) the location of the 
property; (2) how long it remained 
in that location prior to the search; 
(3) its condition at the time of the 
search; (4) whether the owner 
asked a third party to watch over 
it; and (5) whether the owner 
disclaimed or failed to claim the 
property in response to police 
questioning. Id at 733,684 A.2d 
at 829-30 (citing Faulkner v. State, 
317 Md. 441, 451,564 A.2d 785, 
789-90 (1989)). 
With respect to drug inter-
diction, the analysis centers 
directly on the person's words and 
actions. /d. at 737, 684 A.2d at 
831. In particular, a court must 
determine if there was an affirm-
ative disclaimer of ownership, 
which ordinarily constitutes aban-
donment. Id at 737, 684 A.2d at 
831-32. In the instant case, the 
troopers wrongly concluded that 
Stanberry's bag was abandoned 
even though there had been no 
affirmative disclaimer on his part 
prior to the search of the bag. Id 
at 738, 684 A.2d at 832. 
Moreover, the court main-
tained, abandonment cannot be 
inferred simply because a person 
remains silent or refuses to co-
operate with the police during 
questioning. Id at 736, 684 A.2d 
at 831. "[A] refusal to cooperate, 
without more, does not furnish the 
minimal level of objective jus-
tification needed . . . for a . . . 
seizure." Id. (quoting Bostick, 501 
U.S. at 437)). The court therefore 
held that the troopers could not 
infer that Stanberry abandoned his 
suit bag when he temporarily left 
the bus and the other passengers 
did not respond to the troopers' 
questioning. Id at 738-39, 684 
A.2d at 832. 
The court viewed these factors 
in conjunction with the principle 
that a person ordinarily maintains 
a legitimate expectation of privacy 
in the contents of luggage ("a 
common repository for one's 
personal effects . . . inevitably 
associated with the expectation of 
privacy.") Id at 734, 684 A.2d at 
830 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979)). The 
court concluded that Stanberry's 
expectation of privacy was not 
eliminated and analogized his 
situation to a traveler who checks 
baggage with an airline or a person 
who parks a car at a commercial 
garage. Id at 734-35, 684 A.2d at 
830-31. The court specifically res-
tricted its holding to interdiction, 
recognizing that individual privacy 
interests must often give way to 
situations in which the police, 
acting under the "emergency-aid" 
exception, are involved in the 
preservation of human life. Id at 
742-43, 684 A.2d at 834. The 
"emergency-aid" exception is evi-
dent, for example, where the police 
suspect that a person's luggage 
contains an explosive device. Id. 
at 743, 684 A.2d at 834. 
Stanberry illustrates that 
interdiction is now an accepted and 
widely used weapon in a pro-
tracted war on drugs. Presumably, 
law enforcement officials have 
concluded that among the various 
modes of passenger transportation, 
buses are a popular choice for 
interstate drug traffickers since, 
relatively speaking, bus trans-
portation is cheaper, bus travel and 
bus terminals are more pervasive, 
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and security at bus terminals is 
more attenuated than, for example, 
at airports. It would seem that by 
definition, interdiction activities 
should command the highest level 
of procedural safeguards. 
Maryland's location along the 
Interstate 95 corridor makes it 
especially susceptible to the influx 
of illegal drugs, and the Stanberry 
opinion could impact interdictions 
in other Interstate 95 corridor juris-
dictions such as the District of 
Columbia and Virginia. 
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